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Abstract: 
Despite the dramatic change in the organization of the US hog industry over the 
past two decades, the existing literature offers little insight into the decision by pork 
packers to use long-term marketing contracts, which represent the dominant form of 
hog procurement transactions. Existing studies focus instead on the efficacy of 
incentive mechanisms for which contracts are neither necessary nor sufficient, on 
hog producers’ motivations for accepting contracts, or on packers’ use of production 
contracts or vertical integration, which represent a relatively small share of 
slaughtered hogs. This paper offers a framework to explain pork packers’ adoption 
of marketing contracts based on packers’ downstream strategic market positioning 
and their resulting demands for specific hog quality attributes. Based on an analysis 
of hog procurement contract terms and of survey data related to packers’ 
procurement practices, we provide support for the argument that packers’ use of 
contracts is driven by issues of measurement costs and demand for intertemporal 
consistency of quality rather than by technological and market structure factors 
associated with asset specificity arguments. 
   
  1
Achieving consistency in hog quality has been one of the greatest challenges in the US pork 
industry. Packers, processors and retailers all ranked lack of uniformity in live hogs, carcasses, 
and retail cuts with regard to size and backfat as the most important quality issue facing the 
industry in the mid 1990s (NPPC, Pork Quality Audit, 1994), and quality consistency 
continues to be a leading industry concern (Martinez and Zering, 2004).   
The past 15 years have also witnessed dramatic changes in the organization of the US hog 
industry. In 1993, over 83% of hogs were sold through spot markets while 11% were sold 
under marketing contracts. By 2005, only 11% of hogs were sold through spot markets, with 
67% sold under marketing contracts and over 20% owned by packers through formal 
integration or production contracts. Production contracts differ from marketing contracts in 
that the packer (contractor) owns the hogs throughout the production process and typically 
exerts a degree of managerial control over the production process while under marketing 
contracts the growers owns the hogs and retains managerial control of the production process.1 
This shift in hog industry organization has been the subject of great interest from 
agricultural economists, politicians, and industry participants alike. In a Congressionally-
mandated study by the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), 
Vukina, et al., (2007) provide a detailed description of the use of what they call alternative 
marketing arrangements (AMAs), including various types of contracts and vertical integration. 
While that study provides a rich descriptive analysis and attempts to offer some economic 
rationale for the use of AMAs, they do not provide or test a theoretical explanation for the 
choice of AMA. Instead, the focus is on the broader economic impacts of AMA use along the 
lines of Xia and Sexton (2004) and Wang and Jaenicke (2006). 
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Although there is a large literature on the change in US hog industry structure, there is very 
little theoretical or empirical evidence to explain the role of marketing contracts in the 
production-processing stage of the pork value chain. By and large, research has focused on the 
risk-shifting attributes of contracts and idiosyncratic preferences of hog producers, using 
production contracts made between hog growers and hog production firms or pork packers for 
the production and exchange of baby pigs or slaughter hogs, respectively. Johnson and Foster 
(1994) and Kliebenstein and Lawrence (1995) argue the primary reason for contractual 
agreements in the hog industry is risk-reduction. Zheng, et al., (2008) examine the role of risk 
aversion in contract choice and find that growers choosing to produce under production 
contracts have higher measures of risk-aversion than those producing for the cash market or 
under marketing contracts, but they fail to distinguish between those who use spot markets and 
marketing contracts. Gillespie and Eidman (1998) and Davis and Gillespie (2007) find risk 
aversion as well as growers’ preferences for autonomy are important in hog producers’ choice 
of business arrangements. However, these studies do not specifically focus on the producer-
packer interface, nor do they consider packers’ motivations for contracting. 
At the packer level, Martinez (1999) and Hayenga (1998) suggest that modern, high-speed 
processing plants require tight control over inflow of live animal inputs because they have 
more sharply-sloped short-run average cost curves. Both studies suggest that increasing use of 
non-traditional organizational arrangements has been forced by increases in physical asset 
specificity or temporal specificity resulting from investments in idiosyncratic slaughtering 
plants and market concentration in hog production. However, there is little empirical evidence 
to indicate the nature or degree of asset specificity, or the size and potential appropriability of 
any associated quasi-rents.  
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Measurement costs have also been considered to explain the choice and structure of hog 
marketing contracts. For example, Martinez and Zering (2004) argue that the input 
requirement and monitoring provisions frequently found in hog marketing contracts reduce the 
costs to measure pale, soft, exudative (PSE) and safety attributes of hogs. Although Martinez 
and Zering’s analysis of a small sample of long-term hog marketing contracts offers plausible 
clues to understand the design of the contracts, there remains a need to empirically study the 
heterogeneity of pork packers’ use of alternative organizational forms for slaughter hog 
procurement. 
We propose a theoretical explanation for the use of the dominant institutional form, namely 
long-term marketing contracts, in the presence of buyer-specific quality attributes in an 
otherwise commoditized industry. This theoretical framework draws from and builds upon the 
theory of price discovery costs (Coase, 1937; Cheung, 1983). In particular, the paper develops 
an idea that accounts for the use and structure of long-term marketing contracts to increase 
intertemporal quality consistency in hog procurement. The paper links the packer’s decision to 
move from spot-market transactions to long-term marketing contracts to the packer’s 
downstream product differentiation strategy. Based on a review of marketing contracts filed 
with GIPSA and on an analysis of original survey data from packing plant managers, we 
provide empirical evidence to support the argument and its explanatory power relative to 
existing theories including multi-task agency theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) and 
asset specificity consideration (Williamson, 1996). We conclude with suggested extensions 
and broader applications of the theoretical and empirical results. 
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Downstream Product Differentiation and Contracting for Consistency 
The US pork industry has experienced significant changes on both the supply and demand 
sides during the past three decades (Lawrence, et al., 1997; Martinez and Zering, 2004; Vukina, 
2007). On the demand side, increased competition among pork packers in downstream product 
design has added to the traditional type of price competition. Pork packers’ involvement in 
product differentiation activities can be viewed as an attempt either to avoid price competition 
(Tirole, 1988) or to meet diverse consumer preferences (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974). Based 
on a large body of descriptive industry publications on changes in the demand for pork 
products, we adopt the view that competition on pork product design has been mainly driven by 
the change and heterogeneity in consumers’ value functions for pork products in domestic and 
foreign markets. In addition, it is widely accepted that the competition on pork product design 
has been enhanced by competition with chicken products. 
Consumers’ value functions for pork products have changed to emphasize three types of 
pork product attributes: leanness; meat quality attributes such as marbling, muscle color, and 
meat tenderness; and the consistency in the size and leanness of pork cuts and other quality 
attributes.2 The diversity in consumers’ value functions has developed within and along 
market segments, such as between domestic and foreign markets and between case-ready 
branded fresh pork products, boned or boxed pork products and further-processed pork 
products. These different market segments induce packers’ demand for different hog (quality) 
characteristics. For example, in the domestic market pork packers specializing in processed 
meats prefer a lighter carcass while others prefer a heavier carcass for boned or boxed 
products. Restaurants prefer relatively small loins, which come from 230-pound hogs 
compared to the standard 270-pound hogs (Martinez and Zering, 2004). Marbling is desirable 
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for fresh loins, but less so for processed products. In the export market, lighter hogs with more 
tender meat and more marbling are preferred at the Japanese consumer markets, for example 
(Ray and Cravens, 2002; Miller, et al., 1999). 
While the existing literature links the emergence of hog marketing contracts to pork 
packers’ needs to procure hogs of high quality in general (Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995; 
Lawrence, et al, 1997; Vukina, et al, 2007), it fails to explain the need for marketing contracts 
to attain high quality. We argue that packers’ downstream product competition strategies affect 
the relative costs of spot markets versus long-term contracts in upstream hog procurement. 
Specifically, we argue three factors combine to explain packers’ use of marketing contracts 
based on their specific demand for quality attributes. 
First, growing market segmentation and increasing differentiation activities in consumer 
pork products have resulted in escalating heterogeneity in the specifications of pork packers’ 
desired hog quality attributes. As buyers desire to procure a class of idiosyncratic products, the 
effectiveness of auction markets, a traditional form of spot market, is significantly diminished 
because auction markets function based on a presumption that the products to be exchanged 
are defined ex ante among all potential traders. Moreover, auction markets function based on 
“lots” or batches of animals rather than on individual animals, thus pricing is based on the 
average quality of animals in the lot.  
Alternatively, individual pork packers may adopt posted-price form of exchange, for 
instance, by announcing ex ante a carcass merit program to buy hogs with idiosyncratic quality 
attributes based on the buyer’s private grade and standard. Although such a posted price 
mechanism might be considered form of informal contract, it is so only in the sense that prices 
  6
are generically offered prior to exchange and it need not necessarily require a formal 
marketing contract to be implemented between the packer and any individual hog producer. 
Thus the detrimental impact on auction market efficiency of packers’ heterogeneous 
demand for quality attributes is not enough to explain the prevalent use of hog marketing 
contracts, and especially long-term marketing contracts with durations ranging from 3 to 10 
years (Martinez and Zering, 2004). So why are long-term contracts the dominant form of 
contract for hog marketing transactions? This question leads us to the second factor based on 
pork packers’ downstream marketing strategy, namely packers’ need for intertemporal quality 
consistency. While packers’ downstream product quality strategies may be diverse (and 
therefore also their demand for specific hog quality attributes), maintaining consistent product 
quality within a brand has become increasingly important, especially for a pork packer whose 
target consumers are fairly sensitive to the specific quality attributes and their intertemporal 
consistency. We elaborate on how the packer benefits from the use of long-term contracts later 
in this section.  
The third factor influencing the choice of hog procurement contracts is related to the 
limitation of spot markets with regard to creating an incentive price scheme when certain 
quality attributes are difficult to measure. This factor becomes relevant when pork packers’ 
product differentiation activities are based on difficult-to-measure meat quality attributes such 
as meat color, marbling, and tenderness. This factor will be discussed in the following section. 
Here we focus on the first two factors, which are relatively underexplored. 
Measureable Quality Attributes and the Limitations of Carcass Merit Programs 
Hogs in the US are not typically graded by USDA standards, but by a matrix of measurable 
quality attributes of carcass, namely carcass merit programs (Vukina et al., 2007). Packers 
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create a menu of premiums and/or discounts for combinations of attributes relative to the price 
of a standard “base hog.” The base price of a hog is paid on a per-pound basis while quality 
premiums and discounts apply on a head basis, a pricing scheme for quality performance based 
on measurements of carcass weight and lean percent or backfat of individual hogs. Premiums 
or discounts for those two quality attributes of individual hogs are made on the in-or-out status 
of the individual hog’s carcass weight and percent lean relative to the target ranges set in the 
packer’s carcass merit program. These adjustment rates are established as either a percentage 
of base price or an absolute dollar amount on a head basis. Therefore, producers have an 
incentive to sort hogs into groups that meet the target weight and groups that requires further 
feeding.3 The premium and discount rates induce hog producers to sell hogs at different times 
because it may be more profitable to sell some hogs today and keep the remaining hogs on 
feed for additional days or weeks.  
While premiums and discounts in carcass merit programs provide producers with incentives 
to deliver hogs based on packers’ idiosyncratic demand values, the strength of these incentives 
fluctuates based on variation in relevant market prices. For example, an increase in the feed 
price may weaken the quality incentive scheme by increasing the costs of attaining the target 
weight range. Similarly, an increase in the base hog price encourages producers to feed more, 
which may result in overweight hogs. Depending on the nature of the quality price matrix and 
the relative magnitude of the market price fluctuations for feed and base hog weight, producers 
may no longer have incentive to deliver the packer’s desired hog quality. Thus, the market 
price volatility induces an erosion effect on the quality price incentives.  
This erosion takes place since individual hog weight itself is a choice variable for 
producers’ profit maximization. Given a three-week marketing horizon, hog producers 
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determine the weight of individual hogs by adjusting the timing of marketing in response to 
the unit price of hogs, feed price, and the feed conversion ratio. Therefore, variation in hog 
weights per batch and over time is a natural result of hog producers’ profit maximization 
behavior given the biological and economic constraints (Poray, 2002).  
Figure 1 illustrates the case described above. The y-axis represents the net value of hog 
weight to the producer. The net value of hog weight initially increases with hog weight, but 
increases at a diminishing rate over the marketable window of the hog’s maturity as feed 
conversion efficiency declines. Eventually the net value may begin to decrease since the feed 
quantity per unit of weight gain increases after a certain point of maturity. A producer would 
choose to market the hog at the peak of the function, all else equal. The baseline case is 
represented by the continuous, inverted U-shaped line. 
The dotted line in Figure 1 illustrates the adjustments to the net value function associated 
with a packer’s premiums and discounts relative to the target weight range, denoted by the 
lower bound, WbL, and the upper bound, WbU. This incentive increases the marginal net value 
of “feeding out” smaller hogs to attain the target weight range and decreases the marginal net 
value of continuing to feed hogs beyond the desired weight range. As a result, the density 
function of hogs marketed in the desired weight range should increase, all else equal.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Finally, the erosion effect associated with volatility in the base hog price and the price of 
feed is also illustrated in Figure 1. The dashed line represents the change to the net value 
function (including quality incentive adjustments) associated with either an increase in base 
hog price or a decrease in feed price. At a sufficient magnitude of price change, the 
equilibrium hog weight, Ws*’, is greater than upper bound of hog weights targeted by a hog 
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buyer, WbU. We may also imagine the opposite effect of delivering underweight hogs when the 
base hog price declines or the feed price increases. Either case results in hog weight outcomes 
that deviate from the buyer’s target range of carcass weights. Thus changes in these relevant 
prices erode the incentive power of the quality premium and discount scheme expressed by the 
dotted line. The erosion effect can be measured by the difference between the two equilibrium 
hog weights. It is easy to see that the potential for adverse outcomes is higher when the target 
weight range, WbU - WbL, is narrower and/or when the variance of base hog and feed prices is 
higher, respectively. 
Contract Specifications on Intertemporal Consistency of Measurable Quality Attributes 
As shown above, a carcass merit program in itself may not be fully effective for ensuring 
consistency in hog quality because of volatility in hog and feed prices. Obviously, pork 
packers could adjust the intensity of the quality incentive to changing market circumstances 
surrounding hog producers by manipulating the adjustment rates. However, such 
readjustments are inefficient for at least two reasons. First, it is costly to continually calculate 
optimal adjustment rates in response to market price variations and to communicate those 
changes to producers. More importantly, a volatile pricing system makes it more difficult for 
hog producers to determine the optimal timing for marketing over a three-week window, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the incentive system. For these reasons, one does not 
observe frequent changes in packers’ adjustment rates relative to the volatility of the hog and 
feed markets. Given the costs associated with quality price incentive systems in spot markets, 
alternative transaction modes are required to effectively increase consistency of hog quality.  
Because long-term hog procurement contracts effectively bundle multiple transactions or 
deliveries, they can be used to create intertemporal incentives to mitigate the incentive erosion 
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problem. In order to begin understanding how long-term contracts address the erosion effect, 
we analyze contract data from the GIPSA’s Swine Contract Library website. GIPSA 
established the library under of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 (LMRA). The 
contract disclosure requirements apply to packers that purchase at least 100,000 swine per year 
and slaughter at packing plants with a federally inspected slaughter capacity of 100,000 swine 
or more per year. This covers 54 plants owned or used by 32 packers as of December 1999. 
The hogs procured by these packers accounted for 96% of the total U.S. hog slaughter in 
federally inspected plants. 
Due to the confidentiality restrictions of the LMRA, the contracts themselves and other 
proprietary information are not available. The GIPSA instead provides a summary of the 
information by contract type and region. Nonetheless, the contract information provided 
permits us to draw an overall picture of the hog procurement contracts governing the vast 
majority of hog marketing transactions. Data on these contracts were retrieved from the Swing 
Contract Library on January 4, 2007.  
Contracts in the GIPSA library reveal two contractual instruments that address quality-
incentive erosion. First, a large portion includes quality-based provisions to create and enforce 
intertemporal incentives. Packers establish target quality performance standards for hog 
producers that span multiple deliveries or periods of time. For instance, performance may be 
based on the average live or carcass weight per load on a weekly, monthly and/or annual basis. 
The objective is to achieve the target average of carcass weights and lean percentages and to 
minimize the standard deviation of individual carcass weights and lean percentage, per load 
and over the duration of the contract (see Table 1).  
<Insert Table 1> 
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The logic behind these incentive and enforcement instruments is that the future reward and 
penalty scheme is based on intertemporal performance, not only spot market conditions. 
Therefore, the quality-adjusted price of hogs transacted through long-term contracts is 
determined by a multipart pricing scheme that includes quality incentives at time t (QAt, 
almost identical to spot market incentives) plus quality incentives for performance over the 
contract period (QAT, incentives in long-term contract transactions): 
Total P(hog) = Pt(base hog) + QAt  + QAT 
The second set of contractual instruments for that reduce quality-incentive erosion have to 
do with base-hog price determination structures such as “window or floor price” and “cost-
plus price” formula. The “base price” in long-term hog procurement contracts is set in a 
variety of ways, but can be classified into three types. The first is “a swine or pork market 
price” formula in which base price is determined by the spot market swine or pork price at the 
time of delivery. The second is a window or floor price formula. Window price formulas 
include floor and ceiling prices set at the time of signing the contract and a sharing rule if the 
reference price falls outside of the window zone. Cost-plus price formulas use corn and 
soybean prices to determine hog production cost. Hog procurement contracts using cost-plus 
formulas also specify a fixed payment (per head) added to the production cost estimates.  
The latter two types of base-price determination structures (window/floor and cost-plus) 
reduce producers’ incentive to adjust market timing in response to changes in spot market hog 
prices (in the window/floor price formulas) or feed prices (in cost-plus price formula) because 
the contract base-price paid is more stable than spot market hog prices or compensate for 
changes in feed price. In this regard, the pricing structure of the contracts helps significantly 
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reduce the opportunity costs of market timing decisions in a way to align producers’ incentives 
with pork packers’ objective of hog quality consistency. 
It is important to note that the foregoing explanation for the use of long-term contracts is not 
dependent on investments in relationship-specific durable assets and risks of opportunism. 
This is not a moral hazard issue in the traditional sense, but rather an issue of transaction costs 
in identifying and implementing state-contingent optimal prices to induce provision of a 
particular quality of product attributes, highlighting the costs associated with the price 
determination process (Coase, 1937). Because long-term contracts can be used to bundle 
multiple “spot” transactions and make quality incentives interdependent over time, they are 
more effective than spot markets in creating incentives that lead to a more consistent supply of 
hog quality attributes.  
In summary, pork packers’ downstream product differentiation strategies induce demand for 
narrower ranges of measurable hog quality attributes in upstream hog supply markets. The 
narrower a buyer’s target range of attributes (i.e., the greater the specificity of hog attributes to 
the buyer’s needs), the greater the likelihood that spot market incentive pricing mechanisms 
will suffer erosion effects and fail to provide sufficient incentive in light of volatile base-hog 
and feed prices. In such cases, packers have incentive to use long-term marketing contracts 
(and other forms of vertical control such as production contracts and vertical integration) to 
resolve the incentive erosion problem. Given heterogeneity in packers’ downstream market 
positions and differentiation among packing plants, we offer the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The share of hogs purchased for a given packing plant using spot market 
transactions is negatively related to degree of specificity at the plant of measurable hog 
quality attributes. 
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Difficult-To-Measure Quality Attributes and Contracting for Input Control 
Increasing consumer demand for meat characteristics associated with difficult-to-measure 
hog quality attributes creates another challenge for pork packers’ transactions for slaughter 
hogs. Hog quality attributes such as meat color, marbling, and tenderness are not impossible to 
measure, but they are costly to measure on an individual hog basis in high-speed slaughter 
lines. Furthermore, the measurement of quality attributes post-slaughtering involves potential 
moral hazard issues since quality outcomes result from a sort of team-production among the 
producer, transporter, and packer (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Information asymmetry based 
on the fact that the producer cannot directly observe the quality measurement adds yet another 
layer to the moral hazard problem, since packers have an incentive to under-report quality 
performance.  
Given these information asymmetry issues, it is impractical for packers to implement 
pecuniary incentives based on objective performance measurement of individual hogs to 
ensure the desire meat characteristics. To make matters worse, incentives for the measurable 
quality attributes discussed earlier, such as leanness and size, may adversely affect the 
difficult-to-measure quality attributes, since hog producers have strong incentives to invest in 
the outcome of the former attributes at the sacrifice of the latter attributes, particularly when 
selecting genetics and feeding programs (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).   
These challenges cannot be resolved through spot market transactions. An incentive system 
theory of the firm suggests unification of ownership between production and slaughtering as a 
solution, highlighting a firm’s ability to better manage incentives for workers (Holmstrom, 
1999). Vertical integration, therefore, is a potential solution since wage workers for hog 
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production under managerial control have little incentive to engage in the contractual 
externality (Baker and Hubbard, 2001). 
However, long-term contracts also provide a mechanism for reducing contractual 
externalities based on difficult-to-measure product attributes. If there is a high task-
programmability between process and outcomes (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1985), the principal 
can design production practice rules for agents to follow that will ensure (or increase the 
likelihood) that the desired quality of product is produced. In our case, the correlation between 
hog meat quality attributes and particular hog genetics and nutrition programs create a degree 
of task-programmability in hog quality production and permits packers to use hog procurement 
contracts to control hog quality attributes. A review of the long-term marketing contracts in the 
GIPSA Swine Contract Library confirms the intuition, revealing that marketing contracts 
include terms concerning the selection of genetics and nutrition programs as well as the design 
and management of production facilities that affect meat quality attributes of hogs.  
Since contractual externality is not observable, we have to identify proxies for the likelihood 
of contractual externalities. The existing literature on meat products suggests that fresh pork 
cuts are the most sensitive to meat quality attributes of hogs that are difficult to measure at the 
time of exchange (Miller, et al., 1999; Smith, 1999; Martinez and Zering; 2004). A pork 
packer that markets branded fresh pork products, therefore, is likely to be more sensitive to 
variation in meat quality attributes of hogs slaughtered than other packers that market case-
ready frozen products, boxed fresh or frozen products, and processed products because the 
marginal negative effects of the variation are substantially higher for fresh pork products. This 
leads to our second hypothesis related to specific quality attributes:  
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Hypothesis 2: Pork packing plants that market case-ready fresh pork products will purchase 
a smaller share of their hog requirements through spot market transactions.  
Temporal Specificity and Using a Formal Contract to Check Opportunism 
Asset specificity has been argued as one reason for the increased use of contracts in hog 
production, therefore we include a test for asset specificity in our empirical model. In particular, 
slaughter hog transactions between pork packers and hog producers may involve temporal 
asset specificity. Unlike many manufacturing operations, it is inefficient for pork packers to 
hold a buffer inventory of live hogs to absorb volume fluctuations and permit work to continue 
at the hog slaughter stage in the event of supply disruptions, due to the extremely high cost of 
maintaining live animals ready for slaughter. Similarly, an inventory of carcasses is feasible, 
but refrigerated storage and meat quality deterioration make such a solution costly. Therefore, 
the non-storability of live hogs requires pork packers and hog suppliers to coordinate the 
product flow in a timely manner given the sequential nature of hog production and processing. 
Buyers who do not secure an appropriate quantity of hogs for slaughter are subject to the 
opportunity cost of idle slaughtering operations. Delivery schedules specified in long-term hog 
procurement contracts have been attributed to such hold-up concerns. 
Transaction cost economics suggests that temporal specificity increases with the buyer’s 
cost of switching from an extant hog supplier to alternate hog suppliers at the last minute, thus 
increasing the probability of hold up by suppliers (Masten, et al, 1991; Nickerson and 
Silverman, 2003). The pork industry literature suggests that temporal specificity increases with 
two factors: slaughter plant technology and thinness of the local hog market. First, modern, 
high-speed packing plants, especially those adopting a double-shift technology, are more 
exposed to higher temporal specificity than those adopting a single-shift technology because 
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the former has sharply sloped short-run average cost curves (Hayenga, 1998, Martinez, 1999). 
Second, it is also assumed that switching costs tend to increase when the quantity of hog 
supply is concentrated in a small number of producers. Martinez (1999) and Lawrence et al 
(1997) claim that a processor that locates in a geographic region with a few large hog 
producers is more likely to be subject to opportunistic behavior by the producers. 
Based on these observations, we propose two hypotheses related to temporal specificity.  
Hypothesis 3-1: Pork packing plants using a double-shift technology will use long-term 
contracts or in-house production for a larger share of their hog procurement. 
Hypothesis 3-2: The more concentrated the local hog market, the more likely a plant will 
use long-term contracts or in-house production for a larger share of its hog procurement. 
Data and Methods  
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey of 108 pork packing plants representing over 
96% of slaughtered hogs in the U.S. between October 2007 and March 2008. Hardcopy 
surveys were mailed to plant managers, who were given the option of completing the survey 
online or by return mail. Follow-up cards and phone calls were made to non-respondents. We 
obtained 25 responses, three of which were omitted due to high incompleteness, resulting in an 
effective response rate of 20%. Our respondent sample is moderately representative of the 
distribution of medium and large scale packing plants. Variable definitions as they relate to our 
hypotheses are listed in Table 2. 
Two features of our data deserve mention. First, 12 packing plants out of 22 respondents 
simultaneously use multiple organizational forms for procuring hogs while 10 plants rely on 
only one form of hog procurement. This feature is consistent with observations in the existing 
literature (Vukina, et al., 2007). One may maintain that there would be an optimal portfolio of 
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alternative organization forms used. Second, contrary to most published research regarding the 
joint use of carcass merit programs and contracting, our sample data indicate that some 
packers use carcass merit programs in spot market transactions, while some packers use 
contracts that do not include carcass merit programs.  
Among the 22 usable responses, nine had missing data either on market share of large 
producers (a proxy for temporal specificity) or on target range of carcass weights (the proxy of 
product specificity). In order to most effectively use the limited number of responses, we 
constructed five alternative imputation rules and conducted sensitivity analyses around those 
constructs. The choice of imputation rule has little effect on the regression results.  
Given the nature of the relations we are examining, we follow the existing empirical 
contracts literature (see Sykuta, 2008, for a review) in specifying a reduced form model to 
estimate and test the effects of variables representing the three alternative explanations for 
pork packers’ choice of organization form. We specify the following equation: 
Spot markets (SM)it = β0 + β1 Product specificity (TRW)it+ β2 Measurement difficulty 
(CRFP) it + β3 Temporal specificity(ST) it + β4 Temporal specificity (MSLP) it + β5 Control 
variable (PS) it + εit.  
This model does not specifically test for the choice of spot markets versus long-term 
marketing contracts.  Rather it tests for the choice between spot market and non-spot market 
organizational forms (AMAs) more generally. Most of the existing research focuses 
specifically on the adoption of production contracts, a form of vertical quasi-integration, rather 
than the adoption of marketing contracts. By focusing on the spot versus non-spot end of the 
organizational spectrum, this paper contributes to the literature by explaining contracting more 
generally, and not vertical (quasi-)integration specifically.  
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We employ two statistical methods to address potential issues of omitted variables and 
corner solution outcomes. First, much of the empirical research on organizational choice 
suffers from potential unobserved individual firm-specific factors which might be correlated 
with the error term (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). This kind of correlation may bias the 
coefficient estimates. In order to address this concern, we designed a survey that requires plant 
managers to respond to the same question item at two different points of time, 2003 and 2006. 
This survey strategy would allow us to deal with the potential omitted variable bias issue by 
using first differences estimation, a special case of the fixed effects model, which effectively 
controls for any time-invariant plant-specific factors in our panel data (Wooldridge, 2002: 279-
285). However, it turns out the dependent variable of spot market share does not vary much 
across time in our data. Packers rarely changed their procurement strategy over this period. As 
a result, the first-differencing model is not practical since many variable values go to zero. 
Instead, we include year dummy variables in the regression to create a time-specific fixed 
effects model rather than firm-specific fixed effects model (Wooldridge, 2002: 272-274).  
The second potential issue arises when a large portion of dependent variable values are 
censored above or below at some values. It turns out that 13 observations in our sample data 
are corner solution outcomes at the top, 100%, and six observations at the bottom, 0%. Given 
these censored observations, OLS estimators would be biased and the t-statistics would not be 
reliable because the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on the independent 
variables cannot be linear and the regression variance is probably not homoskedastic 
(Wooldridge, 2002: 517-529). Given these twin challenges, we employ a double-censored 
Tobit model4 with Huber/White heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates including 
year dummy variables.  
  19
Results 
Table 3 reports the results of alternate regression models including pooled OLS, dummy 
variable regressions, and the Tobit model.5 There is little difference between the first two 
models, suggesting time-specific unobserved effects are not significant in our data. As 
expected, the estimate of the standard deviation of error in the Tobit model is statistically 
significant at 1% level, which implies that the presence of corner solution outcomes of 44% 
significantly affects the regression results. Since the meaning of the coefficient estimates is 
different between the OLS and Tobit models, a direct comparison of the magnitude of the 
estimates between the two is not appropriate.  
<Insert Table 3> 
The results support the primary hypotheses concerning the specificity of hog characteristics 
to packers’ downstream product differentiation strategies. First, the narrower the packer’s 
target carcass weight range (i.e., the more specific the ideal hog weight to the packer’s 
operations), the lower the share of hogs procured through the spot market. This rejects the null 
of Hypothesis 1 regarding measurable product specificity. Likewise, packers producing case-
ready fresh products (i.e., for whom measurement difficulty is a more significant problem) are 
also more likely to use non-spot market forms of transactional structures, as suggested in 
Hypothesis 2.  
In contrast, and contrary to much of the existing literature, neither of the variables 
associated with temporal asset specificity (Hypothesis 3) appears to be statistically significant 
in explaining the choice of spot versus non-spot transaction forms. The explanation that 
double-shift slaughter technology adoption and increasing market share of large hog producers 
negatively influence the share of spot markets in pork packers’ portfolio of organization forms 
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is not corroborated with our data. While the coefficient on slaughter technology at least has the 
expected sign, the coefficient on market share actually changes signs between the models. 
Since market share arguments underlie much of the policy debate, this lack of statistical 
significance is particularly noteworthy.  
There are a few possible explanations for the lack of statistically significant results on these 
terms. First, the relatively small sample may not allow sufficient degrees of freedom to discern 
a statistically sound relation. Second, most research supporting asset specificity arguments has 
focused on the choice of production contracts or vertical integration, not contracting more 
generally or marketing contracts in particular. Since this study focuses on the choice of spot 
versus non-spot market transactions, asset specificity may simply not play a significant role at 
our point of analysis. Finally, it may be that previous research did not properly controlled for 
alternative transaction cost incentives for the adoption of non-spot market organizational forms 
and thus errantly identified a spurious relation with asset specificity. 
Conclusions 
Despite the dramatic change in the organization of the US hog industry over the past two 
decades, the existing literature offers little insight into the decision by pork packers to use 
long-term marketing contracts, which represent the dominant form of hog procurement 
transactions. Existing studies focus instead on the efficacy of incentive mechanisms for which 
contracts are neither necessary nor sufficient, on hog producers’ motivations for accepting 
contracts, or on packers’ use of production contracts or vertical integration, which represent a 
relatively small share of slaughtered hogs.  
This paper fills a gap in the literature by providing a theoretical framework to explain 
packers’ adoption of marketing contracts based on packers’ downstream strategic market 
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positioning and their resulting demands for specific hog quality attributes. We provide an 
analysis of contracting practices revealed in GIPSA’s Swine Contracts Library to illustrate 
how contract terms create incentives for intertemporal quality consistency that cannot be 
achieved through traditional spot market transactions. Survey data from pork packing plant 
managers provides additional empirical support to the hypotheses that contracting is preferred 
when packers desire a more specific set of hog attributes and when packers specialize in 
downstream products that are more affected by difficult-to-measure hog quality characteristics. 
Our results do not support existing arguments relating to asset specificity between hog 
producers and pork packers. The empirical results suggest that the dramatic change in 
organization form in the pork industry may be better explained by the changes in downstream 
markets (demand side) rather than structural changes in the upstream markets (supply side). 
From the theoretical perspective, the pork industry case of contract and vertical integration 
choice can be better explained by costs associated with providing appropriate incentives ex 
ante rather than safeguards against ex post opportunism.  
These results are important for potential policies governing the hog industry. Debate around 
the organization of the hog industry has largely revolved around arguments of market 
concentration and asset specificity. Our results suggest that such arguments fail to explain the 
primary mode of contracting in the hog industry, namely marketing contracts. Instead, our 
results suggest that marketing contracts serve to reduce transaction costs associated with 
determining appropriate quality prices to incentivize hog producers and with measurement 
costs for hog carcass characteristics related to meat quality attributes. Understanding packers’ 
motivations for adopting alternative organizational forms is critical to developing reasonable 
and effective regulatory policies. 
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Finally, although our empirical results indicate new findings for explaining the costs of spot 
markets, we acknowledge the research is subject to some limitations. Like most transaction 
cost empirical studies, we do not directly test Williamson’s transaction cost economics theory, 
contractual externality theory, and the relationship between adjustment costs of quality price 
and product specificity. As noted above, our findings cannot rule out the importance of 
potential Williamsonian transaction costs, which might be more relevant for pork packers’ 
choice between contracts and vertical integration rather than spot markets versus non-spot 
markets. Data limitations, particularly lack of detailed data on pork packers’ strategic market 
positioning in the downstream markets, may reduce the power of the regression results. In 
addition, the relatively small sample size makes the results less robust. Given the relatively 
small size of the relevant plant population, obtaining data on a long time period panel for even 
a small number of pork packers or conducting an in-depth case study would be promising for 
further studies 
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Figure 1. Erosion effects of volatility of base-hogs and feed prices on weight consistency 
incentive price 
 
Table 1. Intertemporal target carcass weights specified in long-term procurement contracts 
Individual hog base (pounds) Load base (pounds) Weight distribution base 
152-259; 163-215; 155-237; 
170-222; 175-206; 164-215; 
>155; 163-215; 189; 
>167; 111-222; 155-241; 
160-249; 170-221; 168-205;  
160-270; 170-222 
<229 in average per load; 
<222 in average per load; 
178-200 in average per load; 
163-192 in a weekly average; 
189-211 in a weekly average  
& >200 in an annual average; 
≥ 190 in monthly average 
Standard deviation of  
individual carcass     
weights delivered each 
week should be no  
greater than 17 pounds 
 
18 observations  6 observations  1 observation 
: under no quality 
price incentives  
: under quality 
price incentives  
: under a 
circumstance 
where the base 
hog price increases 
WS*˝ 
Ws* WbL 
Net value 
of hog  
weight ($) 
WbU 
Hog weight 
(pound) 
|WS* - WS*’| = Erosion effect 
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Table 2. Definition of variables 
Dependent 
variable 
Spot market 
share 
Number of hogs procured through spot markets divided 
by total number of hogs procured by plant i during year t. 
(SMit) 
Theoretical 
variable 
Temporal 
specificity 
Slaughter technology (STit): 1 if plant i uses double shift, 
0 otherwise 
Market share of top 5% large producers surrounding plant 
i (MSLPit) based on the plant manager’s estimate 
Measurement 
difficulty 
Case-ready fresh products (CRFPit): 1 if plant i markets 
case-ready fresh products, 0 otherwise 
Product 
specificity 
Target range of carcass weights (TRWit): calculated by 
high bound minus low bound of the range and then the 
inverse of product specificity are calculated by dividing 
individual target ranges with the highest target range in 
our sample 
Control 
variable 
Plant size Yearly slaughter capacity (PSit): categorized by range 
from 1 to 8 
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Table 3. Comparison among alternative regression models (dependent variable: spot market share) 
 POLS (White SE) Dummy Variable Regression 
(White SE) 
Tobit (Huber/White SE) 
Plant size 
(Control) 
-2.2442 
(7.9063) 
-2.19613 
(7.9970) 
-2.3716 
(14.6713) 
Target range of weights 
(Product specificity) 
57.2417** 
(27.5978) 
57.6196** 
(28.2944) 
78.5959* 
(46.7592) 
Case-ready fresh products 
(Measurement difficulty) 
-23.3828* 
(13.3062) 
-23.4331* 
(13.4781) 
-38.8152* 
(21.8335) 
Slaughter technology 
(Temporal specificity) 
-13.4483 
(21.6597) 
-13.6354 
(21.9686) 
-21.1753 
(37.0926) 
Market share of large producers 
(Temporal specificity) 
0.0953 
(0.2076) 
0.0904 
(0.2142) 
-0.0055 
(0.3384) 
Year dummy1  31.5145 
(50.6193) 
41.8222 
(88.1055) 
Year dummy2  16.6378 
(24.7284) 
42.4139 
(86.5027) 
Constant 32.5462 
(49.1980) 
  
Standard deviation of error   49.1488*** 
(7.9803) 
N (Censored observations in 
parentheses) 
44 44 44 (6: 13) 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01                                           (Standard Errors in parentheses)
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1 Production contracts are also used by hog production firms for production of either baby pigs 
or slaughter hogs. Though, the difference in contractors’ position in pork supply chain has 
received little attention. 
2 An emphasis on leanness had emerged in the 1980s, with human health research reports 
linking fat and cholesterol to cardiovascular disease in people (Martinez and Zering, 2004). Meat 
quality attributes to difficult to measure and the consistency attributes have been becoming 
valuable in pork packers’ branded fresh pork products and products sold to food service chains, 
which feature repeated purchase and thereby reputation (Miller, et al., 1999; Smith, 1999). The 
market share of branded fresh pork products and pork products used at food service chains has 
been increasing particularly since the late 1980s (MacDonald, et al, 2000; Vukina, et al, 2007).   
3 Furthermore, hog producers have incentives to choose an alternative genetics and feeding 
program which produces a lower variation in the growth rates of individual hogs but with some 
opportunity costs of the choice.  
4 One may claim that the sequential decision Tobit model would be the most promising. In the 
Tobit II model, for example, it is assumed that pork packing plant managers first decide whether 
they use spot markets or not, and then they decide the fraction of the procurement quantity that is 
obtained through spot markets or non-spot markets. In order to implement this model, data 
should include different explanatory variables that may affect the first-stage decisions and the 
second-stage decisions. The lack of this data prevents the adoption of the Tobit II model. 
Therefore, the doubly-censored Tobit I model would be the second best alternative. The doubly-
censored Tobit model has been widely used in the empirical studies in organizational economics 
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that involve dependent variable of fractional form and corner solution outcomes (see Lafontaine, 
1993; Nickerson and Silverman, 2003 among others). 
5 We also conducted sensitivity analysis of alternative imputation options. The analytical results 
can be summarized as follows. First, the coefficient estimates of plant size and market share of 
top 5% largest producers are not stable across alternative imputation options and alternative 
regression models whereas those of slaughter technology, case-ready fresh products, and target 
range of carcass weights are stable. Second, more interestingly, the coefficient estimates of plant 
size, market share of large producers, and slaughter technology are not statistically significant in 
all of the imputation options and alternative regression models while those of case-ready fresh 
products and target range of carcass weights are statistically significant. 
